Current Socio-Political Problems of Russia’s Modernization

Abstract

Andrey Vozmitel — Head of the Sector for Complex Studies of Lifestyles, Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences. Address: Bldg. 5, 24/35, Krzhizhanovskii St., Moscow, 117218, Russian Federation. E-mail: vozmitel@isras.ru

In this paper, the author analyzes the state and the role of the major agents of Russia’s eventual modernization, their inter-relationships as well as structures and processes which prevent Russia from following the path of civilized development.

Many agree that Russia’s current underdevelopment creates a demand for its accelerated modernization, i.e. the transition to a competitive, knowledge-driven and high-technology economy. Such a strategic maneuver has become extremely necessary due to an obvious failure of the previous modernization project, i.e. ‘westernization’ that led to a criminalized privatization, and thus an emergence of an enormously unequal caste-like society.

In spite of the rather favorable initial conditions (an abundance of natural resources, high intellectual potential and the relatively low cost of labor) everything collapsed. According to many leading experts, the scales of the country’s economic downturn have been greater than those of the USA during its Great Depression. Its current economic growth already causes a lot of problems and lacks stability, since it is intensified purely through an inflow of petrodollars and foreign loans. This calls for a substantial change in the key spheres of public life, where the role of an efficient state cannot be underestimated.

An efficient state relies primarily on its people’s trust, whose interests, rights and freedoms it bears and secures. Does this apply to Russia’s current authorities? The analysis of the data from a number of all-national surveys shows that Russian people more or less explicitly regard the Russian state as a protector and a mouthpiece of the rich, the administrating and business class, whose interests are not only interrelated but usually tightly soldered together through a corruption contract. The Russian state is regarded as a ‘socially oriented state’ only in 16% of cases, while only 21% of respondents see it as a ‘democratic’ state.

However, it should be outlined that the people clearly distinguish between their trust in the supreme power (the president, the prime minister and their appointed officials) and their usual distrust in other power structures. Neither the legislative bodies, nor the executive power are legitimate in Russia’s public opinion. Moreover, precisely such identification of the latter with governmental bodies leads to a negative perception of power and its rejection as a whole.

Thus, there has once again formed an opposition between ‘us’ (common people) and ‘them’ (the ruling class of the state bureaucracy and business) — the cause of social cataclysms in the past.

What lies at the core of this cleavage? What has to be overcome in order to make modernization possible? This article addresses the issue of the number one enemy in any democratic state and any positive change in society — corruption.

The existence of a strong lobby of higher bureaucrats and large businessmen has led to the adoption of an emasculated version of the anti-corruption law. Precisely, it has been revised to exclude an internationally accepted clause, according to which illegal property is subject to confiscation. The analysis shows that this law, be it on purpose or a misunderstanding, has an absolutely opposite effect and only imitates the struggle against corruption.

Unfortunately, the adopted law and the following practice create an impression that the authorities (except for supreme power) clearly aim at reducing the scale of the public discussion and making the people conform to it as an inevitable evil that can be overcome through occasional disciplinary measures. As a result, the problem remains completely unresolved. A thorough analysis of the nature and factors of corruption in Russia and other countries — who, at least, seriously try to solve this problem (China), have recently fought it (Singapore, Turkmenistan, Japan) or have solved it long ago (Switzerland, Scandinavian countries, Germany, etc.) — shows that Russia completely lacks such strategy.

Corruption in today’s Russia is a multifold phenomenon of total lawlessness: the unbundling and stripping of budgets, bribery, criminal protection and crime suppression, money laundering, the lobbying of business interests via all branches of power, etc. Moreover, after the tragedies of Budenovsk, Dubrovka and Beslan, corruption has apparently become one of the major causes for growing terrorism and extremism.

Why then do authorities struggle so relentlessly against the consequences (terrorism), and limit themselves to doubtfully efficient measures when fighting against its primary cause? The author is tries to answer this question.

The struggle for Russia’s new path development will not only be open to the public, but the public itself will have to become one of its major actors. This is the motive was announced in the President’s Address to the Federal Assembly. Unfortunately, since 1993 the direction of Russia’s policy has been generally oriented towards a completely different future: the people were about to lose the status of a political actor and become a passive force of the state and societal change.

This is not a casual turn, although it is only a declaration of Dmitry Medvedev. It seems to be the result of the previous modernization attempt, which has brought up a cynical, avaricious and consumption oriented personality. It looks as though the state has finally realized that Russia has come to a dead-end with market ‘mutants’ swarming in its structures, criminal and semi-criminal business. This dead-end can only be overcome through a multifold modernization and meritocratic mobilization of the masses. The main obstacle preventing them from entering the process of modernization is lawlessness and insecurity that lead to a total irresponsibility.

That is why successful modernization would only become possible when people regain trust in themselves as an active force of this process. The first step towards such change is a shift from imitative democracy to an authentic sovereignty of people and the supremacy of their power. This would be a direct warranty of the Russian Constitution, i.e. the carrying out of referendums addressing the country’s most vital issues, including efficient measures against corruption (something the Russian Parliament has yet failed to develop).

The people can provide a substantial support for power in working out clear and long-term goal as well as appropriate means for the fulfillment. The making of a free society for free people is a worthy goal after all. It requires a solid social, legal, moral and ethic basis to help moderate the people’s social and economic instincts, its manners and habits, which were fostered by an inefficient and often anti-social use of private property over the means of production. In other words, the development of civil control over the state and business authorities is desperately needed.

The results presented in this paper help distinguish the core problem to be resolved by means of both, society and the state, to enhance the process of modernization: the creation of a new public solidarity between the state and its people, and the people and business. The previous models have already proved their inefficiency.

First of all, this concerns a change in the character of power, which has to demonstrate its loyalty to the people rather than currency traders, corrupted officials and the semi-criminal business. Today, as never before, Russia requires a strong state able to overcome the total corruption, oligarchic and monopolistic structures which harm its economy and postpone modernization.

A critical review of existing social and political practices allows for a number of reasonable, as well as quite disputable suggestions, which could prove useful in stipulating the process of modernization in Russia.