Cultural Factors of Modernization Politics and Particular Russian Culture: Pros and Cons of Modernization (Debate Club Materials)

Abstract

There is continuous debate in Russia, as well as in many other parts of the world, on whether cultural factors affect modernization and determine the prospects of social and economic development. In this issue of the “Universe of Russia”, we publish the materials from one such debate which took place at Moscow State University on November 17th, 2011 at the instigation of the Association of Independent Centres for Economic Analysis. The two leading specialists in the field of Russian sociology (B. Dubin, Levada-Centre) and institutional economics (A. Auzan, Moscow State University) discuss the role of culture in social, political and economic modernization of non-Western countries. They speculate on Russia’s modernization prospects in this particular context.

Dubin openly claims that he is skeptical about the cultural argument. His arguments are based on vast amounts of sociological data collected by the Levada-Centre over the past 20 years. These data paradoxically show that there is little demand for modernization among Russians, although the latter is generally regarded (also in the elites) as a certain ‘good’. What this means is that people actually want the change to happen, but preferably not now and not from their own effort.

Secondly, Dubin has certain objections against modernization as some ‘written project’. He rather defines it as slow and simultaneous progress in all aspects of society’s being, which is, in fact, a by-product of the struggle for political and economic power between various elite and proto-elite groups. On the other hand, modernization is not about a change in economic or political regime, but rather a cardinal change in behavior models — individual as well as collective — and their regulation via certain norms and institutions. According to Dubin’s claims, a modernized society is based on autonomy, competition and solidarity. And this is, indeed, a historical idea which has been invented by Western societies. Such societies put a stronger emphasis on personal achievements rather than ascribed characteristics. They are based on functional differentiation which constantly develops and progresses, while at the same time promoties universal orientations, norms and values. And this is where Russia has, in fact, particularly serious problems.

Dubin characterizes the current Russian society as a “scattered mass” or “spectators” — referring to the lack of participatory behavior in Russians. This is when people observe many bad things that happen in their own country (war, crimes, corruption, terrorism, etc.), but prefer to stay away and let it go. At the same time, this situation of extreme “scatteredness” produces a situation of extreme particularism in private relations. For instance, it is quite common among Russians to expect a particular attitude from others (and, often, neglect the existing social rules).

Nevertheless, Dubin is optimistic about the future, since he also makes note of emerging and expanding self-organized (rather than state-led) social movements and public organizations. Of course, these phenomena are yet too few to be considered as a strong social force, but it would eventually grow into something bigger, enough to promote serious positive change (although via cultural or educational, rather than political revolution).

In his response to Dubin’s arguments, A. Auzan refers to examples of contemporary societies which are not yet modern, but are no longer traditional. Another peculiar example is the so-called “Western off-shoots” (a Western post-colonial legacy), which has actually never been a traditional society. Auzan recalls the famous Lipset modernization hypothesis. According to this, at some point economic growth in every society produces enough wealthy and educated people to create a sufficient demand for political modernization. However, this hypothesis has been numerously supported and criticized already for 52 years and there is not yet a single opinion about “what drives what”.

Auzan develops his own argument from the well-known empirical work by Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yarred. These authors have run dozens of different regressions to show that neither economic growth, nor political modernization themselves are the necessary conditions for successful development. However, there is certainly a third, yet unaccounted, factor. He further refers to the recent book by North, Wallis and Weingast who consider particular social institutions that historically emerge in societies and, thus, affect the course of any social change. To support his argument, Auzan further demonstrates a series of GDP per capita long-term profiles for various countries based on A. Maddison’s famous time rows beginning with 1820, and onto 2010. Among them, he distinguishes 1) the countries of the so-called “Christian trajectory”, i.e. the Western European countries which have been developing steadily but at slower paces, 2) a group of middle Asian and north-eastern countries which heavily depend on natural resources and, thus, are characterized by very unsteady trajectories, 3) the countries of the so-called “Confucian trajectory”, which have recently entered the age of steady and quick development, i.e. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, 4) a group of South-Eastern countries, which have only entered modernization, with most notable case of Malaysia — probably the first successful Islamic modernization. The next thing he does is overlaps this data with the data from various cross-cultural studies (i.e. Hofstede, Inglehart, Schwarts) collected over the past 40-45 years. And their findings show that both the Confucian and Western modernizations are associated with even changes in certain values, i.e. a shift from values of survival to secular-rational values, a decrease in power distance and an increasing individualization. By showing this, Auzan concludes that cultural change is possible and, moreover, it is the key to successful modernization.

He further comments on the results from their own sociological study of Russian highly skilled professionals working in innovative industries in Russia (Saint-Petersburg), Germany (Berlin and northern Westfalia) and USA (Maryland and New Jersey). The goal of the survey was to establish typical characteristics of Russian workers, which distinguish them from their counterparts from other countries. The results were quite striking, since almost all Russians are characterized by radical (even conflict-bearing) individualism, valuing personal achievements over career and promotion, universal qualifications, and, at the same time, a complete disregard for solving routine tasks and problems. All of this, according to Auzan, is a perfect explanation for commonly seen situation of complete dedication of Russians in solving complex and non-trivial problems, but at the same time their authoritarianism and lack of negotiability as managers. One of the most serious failures to account these traits for production purposes is the well-known Russian car industry, which has failed to produce a decent car for civil purposes, but at the same time successfully developed a state-of-the-art super-car “Marussia” to be sold and produced in a small series. The same logic applies to everything else and, particularly, the nuclear and aerospace industries. However, the other striking result from this research is that such cultural traits can easily be changed via education. The Russians who work for innovative industries abroad, but have at some point acquired Western education, were far less likely to demonstrate the above mentioned characteristics.

Finally, by considering all of the above, Auzan develops the layout for successful Russian modernization, first, by exploiting its current cultural advantages and, second, by gradually changing the cultural patterns via the education system and, particularly, its humanitarian component. The debate has provoked an active discussion, followed by various critical arguments and supportive opinions in favor and against both positions.