Appropriation of Property in Olympic Capitals: Sochi in a Comparative Perspective

Abstract

Nikolay Karbainov — PhD Student, European University at Saint Petersburg. Address: 3, Gagarinskaia St., Saint Petersburg, 191187, Russian Federation. E-mail: nkarbainov@eu.spb.ru

This article deals with the practices of private property expropriation in Sochi in a comparative perspective with other Olympic cities. “Elite” and “folk” hypotheses are tested in comparative analyses. A sociological approach to the analysis of ownership and the critical paradigm are utilized. The main conclusion of the paper is that, on the one hand, the process of property expropriation in Sochi has many common characteristics with the processes that took place in other capitals of the Olympic Games; on the other hand, there are features that are unique to Sochi. The process of property seizure that took place in Sochi has much in common with the same processes in other Olympic cities. Coalitions of elites (“growth machines”) always use the occasion of the Olympic Games to promote the idea of economic growth, and by doing that, to justify the expropriation and redistribution of property. City-dwellers in poor legal positions (like tenants, squatters, etc.) and socially disadvantaged groups (like the poor, ethnic and racial minorities, etc.) lose their property in the wake of economic growth ideas.

Research demonstrates that owners have no possibility to avoid property expropriation and to achieve fair compensation for the land they lost. Compensation for the land is seldom formed in accordance with the market price for the land. It also does not take into account the use value of the property. Thus, an “elite” hypothesis is proved partly, but the “folk” hypothesis cannot be rejected. In spite of the similarities between “kind” and “evil” Olympic Games, they are markedly different from the perspective of law enforcement practices used in the process of land seizure. Cities that hosted “kind” Olympics facilitated the process of land expropriation in accordance with the legal framework. However, these cities applied a policy of double standards in relation to different groups of owners. Real practices of property expropriation enforcement diverge from the procedure that is required by the formal law in the host cities of “evil” Olympics. Olympic preparations in Seoul were characterized by these discrepancies between formal law and law enforcement to a great extent. The preparation for the Olympic Games in Beijing and Sochi also encountered this discrepancy during land expropriation. It should be noted that property regimes and political regimes of the country influence much of the process of land seizure.

Host cities of “kind” Olympic Games have strong private property regimes and democratic political order. Host cities of “evil” Olympic Games, in opposition, have either weak private property regimes with a large amount of informal owners (South Korea), state property regimes (China), or transitional property regimes (Russia). The authoritarian political regime is a common characteristic of all three above mentioned countries. Listed differences between countries that hosted “kind” and “evil” Olympic Games reject the second part of the “elite” hypothesis, emphasizing that the process of property expropriation is always organized in accordance with the legal framework. At the same time, Sochi demonstrates the peculiarities of property expropriation that are explained by the transition property regime in post-Soviet Russia. Processes of squatter land legalization and expropriation took place simultaneously, which resulting in social conflict between the authorities and city-dwellers.