When Mayors Object: Factors of Municipal Autonomy in a Centralized State

Abstract

Political and economic centralization entail the local level authority being embedded in the “power vertical”. Centralization predicts that municipalities will conform to the policies of the federal and regional authorities and their administrative innovations. However, some municipalities in Russia resist their implementation or implement them variably. The article seeks an answer to this puzzle, focusing on explanations for why municipal autonomy can vary in a centralized state. The article is based on interviews with municipal and regional officials and media, collected from autumn 2018 to spring 2019 in the Novgorod, Sverdlovsk, and Tver regions. We find support for six factors of local autonomy in a centralized state: (1) relative budget autonomy and less dependence on regional budgets; (2) direct elections or double accountability for appointed municipal heads; (3) the opposition of mayors to, or their importance for, the state political machine; (4) a level of mayoral rootedness in the territory contributing to lower dependence on higher-level authorities and the quality of informal linkages with regional officials; (5) the competition of economic actors and the dependency of a mayor on local business; (6) competition between the municipal head and the local council.